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NOTES
ERISA, TRUST LAW, AND THE
APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW:
A DE NOVO REVIEW OF WHY THE
ELIMINATION OF DISCRETIONARY




A recent advertisement for the American Family Life
Assurance Company ("AFLAC") shows the iconic Yogi Berra
deadpanning that you need AFLAC so that "when you get hurt,
and miss work, it won't hurt to miss work."' But what happens
when your insurance company does not disperse your benefits
because, according to their definition, you are not "disabled" or
"unable to work"?2 And what happens if your plan administrator
t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; M.A.,
Theology, 2004, Boston College; B.A., 2002, Boston College. The author would like to
thank all the professors and mentors who influenced his academic experience at all
levels, and most importantly, Kelly James, who is simply the best person he has ever
met.
1 In addition, "they give you cash, which is just as good as money."
2 A good recent example of the interests involved in these cases is Hillery v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 453 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 2006). In Hillery, an
employee suffering from systemic lupus erythematosus had her benefits under a
long term disability plan terminated after eleven years. Id. at 1088-89. The plaintiff
had several medical experts document that she could not return to work after her
lupus became inactive, while Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife")
introduced medical experts who determined that she could return to work. Id. at
1089. In reviewing the decision, the district court used an "abuse of discretion"
standard of review to determine that MetLife was within its authority to terminate
her benefits. Id. at 1090. The court of appeals affirmed despite the conflicting
medical testimony. Id. at 1091-92.
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is the only authority making this determination, to the exclusion
of other figures like your boss, employer, or a medical expert?3
In 1974 Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA")4 to protect policyholders against the
potential abuses that arise out of the private pension
administration of the insurance plans.5 ERISA provides an
extremely complicated scheme that preempts state insurance law
on many points. 6 One major aspect of ERISA is that it affords
statutory protections to policy holders when they have been
denied benefits from their plans. 7
Although ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated
statute,"" it is conspicuously silent regarding the standard of
review for courts to employ when reviewing claims brought by
policyholders. 9 The Supreme Court ruled in Firestone Tire &
3 Many insurance policies accomplish this through the use of discretionary
clauses. See, e.g., Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that policy language clearly indicating administrator's authority to
determine issues of interpretation adequately confers discretion); Lundquist v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that a plan
which states that when "making a benefit determination... [w]e have discretionary
authority to determine [y]our eligibility for benefits" confers discretionary authority
(emphasis omitted)). But see Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 108-
09 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the plain language of the policy did not confer
discretion to the plan administrator).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
5 See generally JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME
SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 3-7 (2004) (discussing the genesis of
ERISA and the protection it seeks to afford). Although ERISA's name and beginning
suggest that it deals with pensions, ERISA actually regulates a wide variety of
services including medical benefits, severance pay, and life insurance. JAYNE E.
ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA LITIGATION, at xi (2003).
6 See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129-30
(1992) (holding that ERISA preempts state law referring to plans regulated by
ERISA even where it is "not specifically designed to affect such plans ... and even if
the law is consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
7 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a)-(c). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "It is hereby
declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect... the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries .... Id. § 1001(b). See also ROBERT
H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 86 (4th ed.
2007) ("ERISA is a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for employee benefit
(i.e., pension and welfare) plans... 'for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,' certain fringe
benefits ...." (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1))).
s Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
9 Because ERISA is silent with regard to the standard of review, the federal
courts have developed their own standards derived from common law principles in
various areas. See Peter A. Meyers, Comment, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of
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Rubber Co. v. Bruch10 that a denial of benefits under ERISA "is
to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan."11 In setting this standard, the Court explicitly recognized
the importance of determining such a standard as most litigable
issues arising under ERISA will "turn on the interpretation of
terms in the plan."12 The Firestone decision created uniformity in
terms of standards of review in ERISA litigation and, until
recently, has been consistently followed without serious question.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
so-called "discretionary clauses" that allocate complete discretion
over an insurance policy to the plan administrator1 3 have been
consistently honored.14 Under Second Circuit case law,
insurance plans that grant full discretion to the plan
administrator have been reviewed under the more deferential
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 15  Other circuits have
utilized a similar, if not the same approach. 16
Interest, and Standard of Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
925, 929 (2005) (discussing the wide interpretations that have been given to the
subject of standards of review due to the lack of direction from the statute itself).
10 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
11 Id. at 115.
12 Id.
13 Generally, an "administrator" is "[a] person who manages or heads a
business, public office, or agency." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 49 (8th ed. 2004). In
the context of an insurance plan, an "administrator" is the person or company who
manages the distribution of benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(i) (2000) ("The
term 'administrator' means-the person specifically so designated by the terms of
the instrument under which the plan is operated.").
14 See, e.g., Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that a discretionary clause in the policy warrants a deferential standard of
review in reviewing the denial of benefits); Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Ins.
Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249-51 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the Firestone decision to the
Second Circuit in holding that denials of benefits are to be reviewed de novo unless
the policy reserves discretion to the plan administrator or fiduciary).
15 See, e.g., Burke, 336 F.3d at 109; Polizzano v. Nynex Sickness & Accident
Disability Benefit Plan, 189 F.3d 461, 461 (2d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision)
(holding that the plan clearly grants discretion and is therefore reviewable under the
more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard).
16 See, e.g., High v. E-Systems, Inc., 459 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2006); Jordan v.
Northrop Grumman Corp. Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 874-75 (9th Cir.
2004) (applying an abuse of discretion standard because the plan accorded discretion
to the administrator). The Ninth Circuit formulates its deferential standard slightly
differently by reviewing cases under an "abuse of discretion" standard. The
difference between the abuse of discretion standard and arbitrary and capricious
standard, however, seems to be semantic rather than substantive. See Holian v.
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Recently, this approach has come under attack in New York.
On March 27, 2006, the New York Insurance Department
("Department") issued a Circular Letter maintaining that the use
of discretionary clauses in insurance policies violates New York
State insurance laws. I7 In addition, the Department advised
Article 43 corporations and HMOs to remove discretionary
clauses from their plans voluntarily or the Department would
withdraw the approval of the plans and policies pursuant to
Article 3110 of New York's Insurance Law.18 On June 29, 2006,
the Department issued another Circular Letter superseding the
aforementioned letter and re-examining the use of discretionary
clauses in insurance plans.' 9 In this letter, the Department
urged Article 43 corporations and HMOs to discontinue their use
of discretionary clauses and noted that it would seek to enact
legislation that would explicitly make the clauses illegal. 20
Leavitt Tube Co., Inc., No. 89-C-0354, 1989 WL 44570, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 1989)
("[Tlhere does not appear to be a significant difference between an abuse of
discretion and an arbitrary and capricious standard."). But see Morton v. Smith, 91
F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the substantive difference between the two
standards). Interestingly, the Firestone Court referred to the standard as "arbitrary
and capricious" rather than "abuse of discretion." 489 U.S. at 109-10, 114. The
arbitrary and capricious standard evidently derives from labor law cases, while the
abuse of discretion standard is the language used in the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts. See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: Re-thinking Firestone in Light of Great-
West-Implications for Standard of Review and the Right to a Jury Trial in Welfare
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629, 631 n.ll (2004) (discussing the use of
the two standards in various cases after Firestone).
17 Charles Rapacciuolo, Asst. Deputy Superintendant, N.Y Ins. Dep't, Circular
Letter No. 8 (2006), http://www.ins.state.ny.us/cl06_08.htm [hereinafter Circular
Letter No. 8]. This has also occurred in other states. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:4-
58.1 (2007) (stating that discretionary clauses in insurance contracts function to
nullify many benefits provided in the contracts themselves). In addition, there have
been movements in other states to convince the state insurance departments to
adopt regulations prohibiting discretionary clauses. See Letter from Elliott
Andalman to Alfred W. Redmer, Jr., Ins. Comm'r, State of Md. (Aug. 31, 2006),
http://andalman-flynn-law.com~library/DISCRETIONARY%20CLAUSE%20-%20EA-
%20INS%20COMMO1.LTR.pdf (asking for a declaratory ruling regarding the use of
discretionary clauses in insurance policies in Maryland).
1s Circular Letter No. 8, supra note 17.
19 Charles Rappaciuolo & Jeffrey Angelo, Asst. Deputy Superintendants, N.Y.
Ins. Dep't, Circular Letter No. 14 (2006) (June 29, 2006), http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
cl06_14.htm [hereinafter Circular Letter No. 14].
20 Id. The tone of the second Circular Letter was markedly different from the
first. In the first, the Department confidently stated that it had the authority to
withdraw plans that violated its position pursuant to state insurance laws. See
Circular Letter No. 8, supra note 17. In its second letter, the Department seemingly
recognized that the use of discretionary clauses does not violate existing insurance
law and, therefore, the exercise of its statutory authority to remove plans would be
[Vol. 82:735
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If the Department succeeds in passing the regulation, it
would have the authority to disapprove policies that utilize
discretionary clauses. This would force federal courts in New
York to conduct de novo reviews in every claim of adverse
benefits administration arising under ERISA because trust law
would no longer apply to the benefits determination. 21 This
consequence deprives the judicial system of its discretionary
function in allocating the appropriate interpretive authority.
Before the Department acts upon its threats, it is important to
consider many factors that support both perspectives, and make
the appropriate judgment in light of the policy issues involved.
In the end, the Department's potential action has the practical
effect of significantly adding to the costs on all sides associated
with litigating ERISA claims, while providing only marginal
improvements to the safeguarding of policy-holder's rights.
Part I of this Note will give a brief background of ERISA,
New York insurance law, the assertions of the Department as set
forth in the Circular Letters, and the Model Act upon which
many statutory schemes draw from. Part II will examine the
Firestone decision and its emphasis on trust law in keeping with
the legislative intent underpinning ERISA. Part III will examine
the policy concerns that both sides raise and will argue that the
current system has benefited the parties that ERISA legislation
has intended to protect while providing additional benefits to the
judicial system.
I. ERISA & NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW22
On September 2, 1974, President Ford signed the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, now commonly referred to as
useless. See Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19. Ultimately, the Department chose
an alternative route by attempting to change the relevant law to grant it authority
over such cases.
21 Although ERISA is a federal statute and would normally preempt state
insurance plans, Congress explicitly exempted state regulations from this through a
"savings clause" in the statute. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
22 For an excellent description of the political landscape leading to the passage
of ERISA, see WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 7-11 (describing the various parties who
supported and opposed the passage of ERISA). In addition, the United States
Department of Labor has an excellent condensed history of ERISA on its website.
See U.S. Dep't of Labor, History of EBSA and ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/
aboutebsa/history.html [hereinafter History of EBSA and ERISA] (last visited Oct..
25, 2007).
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ERISA.23 Congress passed this legislation in response to the
growing importance of pension plans in the American workforce
and the perceived abuses in the administration of private pension
plans.24  This legislation achieved extensive application by
inducing employers to utilize plans that complied with ERISA
standards through favorable tax treatment.25  Although the
benefits of the legislation have become evident over the years,
there was significant opposition to its passage from various
interest groups. 26 The statute was passed primarily to respond to
"abuse and mismanagement in the private pension system" 27 that
had plagued American workers. 28  Initially, pension
administration was governed by the Internal Revenue Service
under the Revenue Acts of 1921 and 1926.29 At that point,
pension administration was governed by tax and labor laws that
generally left the terms and conditions of insurance plans to the
contracting parties.30  In the following years, Congress only
complicated matters by enacting several statutes that suffered
from a lack of criteria for fiduciary conduct. 31 In addition, none of
23 See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 1. President Ford remarked that the legislation
was a landmark moment, and sensed that "'this legislation will probably give more
benefits and rights and success in the area of labor-management than almost
anything in the history of this country.'" Id.
24 Id.
25 See History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 22.
26 See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 7-11 (noting that the pension reform
movement "was as much a debate over competing values as it was a struggle among
conflicting interests"); see also James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure
in the Business The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 683, 684 (2001) (chronicling the shutdown of the Studebaker plant in
Indiana as a major catalyst for the passage of ERISA).
27 BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA, at xi (2d ed. 1987) (giving a brief
history of the regulation of pension plans before the passage of ERISA).
28 Id. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, plan beneficiaries had few safeguards
against abuses by the plan administrators. See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 3
(recounting the risky state of the private pension system prior to the government's
new role under ERISA).
29 See History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 22.
30 See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 3; see also COLEMAN, supra note 27, at xi. This
ultimately meant that the riskiness of pension promises was also left to be decided
by the parties. See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 3.
31 Specifically, Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act to govern
retirement funds and the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act requiring
reporting to the Secretary of Labor. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2000);
29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-48 (2000). For an excellent account of these difficulties, see
Jennifer Claire Sprague, Note, How Secure Are Your Lifetime Benefits?, 30 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 195, 196-97 (2005) (describing how the Labor Management Act lacked criteria
for vesting of benefits and fiduciary conduct and how the Internal Revenue Code
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the statutes effectively addressed the problem of procedural
difficulties in the administration of benefits, ultimately resulting
in an inequitable distribution of benefits. 32 ERISA's passage
provided a completely new regulatory scheme whereby the
government plays an increasingly active role in the
administration of the private pension system.33
Because ERISA legislation was primarily passed to prevent
inequities in the administration of worker's pensions, there was
much less consideration given to employee welfare benefits such
as health insurance.34 However, as health care plans played an
increasingly important role in comprehensive benefits packages
for many employers, health insurance began to be regulated
under ERISA as well.35 Due, in large part, to the increased
emphasis and importance of benefits administration as part of
employer's compensation packages, ERISA has taken on
enormous magnitude and importance as a regulatory scheme.
ERISA legislation is a complex statutory system that can
supersede state laws that deal with employee benefit plans.36 To
allow states to maintain control over certain aspects of benefits
administration, Congress included a savings clause that exempts
failed to protect plan participants); see also History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note
22.
32 See Keron A. Wright, Comment, "Stuck on You The Inability of an Ex-
Spouse to Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 687, 690
(2006) (noting that a major pitfall in early pension plans centered largely around
vesting requirements that were nearly impossible for employees to meet).
33 See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 3.
34 See id.
35 See History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 22. This increasing emphasis on
health care plan regulation is evidenced by the passage of several amendments to
ERISA. In particular, two amendments continue to play a vital role. The
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, popularly known as "COBRA,"
provides for a continuation in health benefits under certain circumstances.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Additionally, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2000 & Supp. 1 2001),
popularly known as "HIPAA," is aimed at "making health care coverage more
portable and secure for employees." History of EBSA and ERISA, supra note 22.
36 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) ("[T]he provisions of this subchapter... shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan .. "). The scope of ERISA's preemption is intentionally broad
and encompassing. The Supreme Court noted that Congress "indicated that the
section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983). "'This principle is intended to apply in its broadest
sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law.'" Id. at 99 (quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29933
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams)).
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state insurance laws from federal preemption. 37 Several states
have already forbidden the use of discretionary clauses in
insurance contracts in their statutory schemes, 38 but these
statutes have only recently been challenged in federal court.39
New York's insurance scheme does not directly address the
use of discretionary clauses, but it has several relevant
provisions that are being wielded as weapons by the Department.
Specifically, insurance plans issued in New York are subject to
review by a Superintendent who has the power to approve or
disapprove of the policy in question. 40 Decisions rendered by the
Superintendent are judicially reviewable under section 326 of the
New York Insurance Law, 4' pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules. 42 Section 3201(b)(1) states that the
Superintendent shall not approve of a policy unless it "conform[s]
to the requirements of this chapter and [is] not inconsistent with
[the] law."43  Additionally, section 3201(c)(1) grants the
Superintendent the ability to
disapprove any policy form for delivery or issuance for delivery
in this state if he finds that the same contains any provision or
has any title, heading, backing or other indication of the
contents of any or all of its provisions, which is likely to mislead
the policyholder, contract holder, or certificate holder.44
37 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("[N]othing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities."). The Supreme Court has struck down challenges
to the savings clause in a number of circumstances. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts law that
required certain minimum benefits in all health insurance policies is not preempted
by ERISA).
38 See Daniel W. Gerber & Kimberly E. Whistler, New York Insurance
Department: Discretionary Clauses Violate the Insurance Law, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept.
2006, at 18, 18-19 (discussing several states' forbidding the use of discretionary
clauses).
39 See Burotto v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 163 F. App'x 565, 566 (9th Cir. 2006). While
the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to determine whether these
prohibitions are excluded from preemption under ERISA, it appears likely that they
would be upheld given the precedent of enforcing the savings clause.
40 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3201-03 (McKinney 2007).
41 Id. § 326.
42 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801-06 (McKinney 2007).
43 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3201(b)(1). This section also provides for an expedited process
that is subject to retroactive modification to ensure that the appropriate safeguards
are in place. See id. § 3201(b)(1)-(b)(6)(B).
44 Id. § 3201(c)(1) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 82:735
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Under these provisions, coupled with the restrictions found in
Article 24,45 the Superintendent's responsibility is to ensure that
the insurance administrators are not "engag[ing] in this state in
any unfair or deceptive act or trade practice."46  In its second
Circular Letter,47 the Department contends that discretionary
clauses violate sections 3201(c) 48 and 4108(a)49 of the New York
Insurance Law. 50 Specifically, the Department maintains that
discretionary clauses in many insurance policies render many of
the other clauses and provisions "illusory" by relegating
interpretation of the policies as a whole solely to the plan
administrator, which effectively precludes adequate judicial
review. 51 In effect, the Department expresses little faith that the
judiciary, functioning according to the current structure and
standard of review, can effectively protect the rights of the
insured.52 Accordingly, the Department threatened to force a
45 Id. §§ 2401-10 ("Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices").
46 Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19.
47 Circular Letters from the Insurance Department are promulgated essentially
as advisory opinions. See Russo v. Cont'l Cas. Ins., No. 05 CIV. 5700(HB), 2006 WL
931683, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2006) ("This change may cause courts in the future
to revisit their use of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review."). This is also
indicated in the text of the second Circular Letter which advises, rather than
mandates, companies to discontinue their use of discretionary clauses. See Circular
Letter No. 14, supra note 19. While the Circular Letters do not have any force of law
behind them, they can cause courts to re-examine their policies. See Russo, 2006 WL
931683, at *3; Downey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 638 F. Supp. 322, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Norman L. Tolle & Peter P. McNamara, Insurance Department Seeks to Change
Standard of Review, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 2006. But see Fenberg v. Cowden Auto. Long-
Term Disability Plan, No. C 03-03898 SI, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22927, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 2004) (holding that one factor in determining that a discretionary clause
is invalid is the persuasiveness of the Department of Insurance's Opinion Letter).
48 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3201(c).
49 Id. § 4108(a).
50 See Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19. The Circular Letter is addressed to
specific insurance entities, including Article 43 corporations, Health Maintenance
Organizations ("HMOs"), and Commercial Insurers. Article 43 corporations are not-
for-profit organizations that are formed pursuant to New York Insurance Law
section 4301(a) and are heavily regulated by state insurance schemes. The
Department regulates the filing and plan designs of HMOs in New York Insurance
Law sections 12 and 13. Finally, Commercial Insurers are identified as insurers who
are authorized to write policies for accident, life, health insurance, and annuities in
New York. See Circular Letter No. 8, supra note 17; Circular Letter No. 14, supra
note 19.
51 Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19.
52 While the Department addresses these concerns in both of these letters, they
have neglected to cite any circumstances in which they view adverse policy decisions
as manifestly unjust. The closest they come is to state that recent cases have viewed
2008]
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substantive change by instructing the Superintendent to decline
policies that employ discretionary clauses as void against public
policy.5 3
The Department's second Circular Letter, which expressly
supplanted the first, seemingly recognized its legal limitations
and approached the problem from a different perspective and a
markedly different tone. 54 The second letter addresses the same
policy concerns with regard to discretionary clauses. 55  The
Department concluded, however, that it would seek to enact
legislation that would explicitly make discretionary clauses
illegal rather than simply decline all policies that utilize
discretionary clauses. 56  This approach ensured that the
Department would avoid adverse judicial determinations brought
in cases where discretionary clauses were still legal.
Interestingly, it appears that the Department is much less
certain of its institutional ability to prevent the use of
discretionary clauses.57
In addition to the positions stated in the aforementioned
opinion letters-and those from other state insurance
departments-the National Association of Insurance
discretionary clauses as "constricting the ability of the courts to exercise de novo
review of policy provisions contained in the insurance policy or contract." Circular
Letter No. 8, supra note 17. It is unclear, however, what the Department is referring
to, as they do not cite any cases or give any indication of the circumstances giving
rise to this view. See Tolle & McNamara, supra note 47 (commenting that it is
unclear to what cases the Department referred).
53 See Circular Letter No. 8, supra note 17. Specifically, the Department urged
that all insurance providers present the Commissioner with a description of
discretionary clauses in their policies and a plan for their revision. If the providers
did not comply, the Department threatened to withdraw approval of their policies
under section 3210 of the Insurance Law. Id.
54 See Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 Or perhaps the Department intended to coerce insurance companies into
compliance with the threat of affirmative action and subsequently retreated from
this strategy. In any event, the second letter seemingly indicates that the
Department needs a legislative judgment that discretionary clauses in insurance
policies are illegal to effectuate this substantive change. Interestingly, the California
Insurance Department has also addressed this issue but opted to proceed on the
strength of its own insurance provisions rather than attempting to pass legislation
on the topic. See Letter from Gary M. Cohen, Gen. Counsel, Cal. Dep't of Ins., to
Teresa S. Renaker, Esq., Lewis & Feinberg, P.C. (Feb. 26, 2004) (on file with
California Department of Insurance) (responding to a request for determination as
to whether discretionary clauses violate California insurance law).
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Commissioners ("NAIC")58 in 2002 promulgated Model Act 42,
entitled "Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model
Act," which, as its name implies, urges states to adopt legislation
that prohibits discretionary clauses in health insurance
contracts. 59 The advisory letters, opinions, and orders that have
been issued from state insurance departments draw heavily on
the language that appears in the Model Act in urging their
legislatures to adopt the prohibition.60 The text of the Model Act
reads, in pertinent part:
No policy, contract, certificate or agreement offered or issued in
this state by a health carrier to provide, deliver, arrange for,
pay for or reimburse any of the costs of health care services may
contain a provision purporting to reserve discretion to the
health carrier to interpret the terms of the contract, or to
provide standards of interpretation or review that are
inconsistent with the laws of this state.
No policy, contract, certificate or agreement offered or issued in
this state providing for disability income protection coverage
may contain a provision purporting to reserve discretion to the
insurer to interpret the terms of the contract, or to provide
standards of interpretation or review that are inconsistent with
the laws of this state.61
The Model Act evinces a patent distrust of discretionary clauses
primarily because they seem to infringe upon the protections
58 NAIC is an organization whose mission is to "assist state insurance
regulators.. . in serving the public interest" and achieve a variety of insurance
regulatory goals. Nat. Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, About the NAIC, http://www.naic.org/
indexabout.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
59 See NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, PROJECT HISTORY: PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES MODEL ACT (2002) [hereinafter PROHIBITION ON
DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES]. The stated purpose of the Model Act is to "assure that
health insurance benefits and disability income protection coverage are
contractually guaranteed, and to avoid the conflict of interest that occurs when the
carrier responsible for providing benefits has discretionary authority to decide what
benefits are due." Id. § 2.
6o See, e.g., N.J. DEP'T OF BANKING & INS., PROPOSED NEW RULE N.J.A.C. 11:4-
58, at 3 (2006), http://www.nj.gov/dobi/proposed/prn06-268.pdf (noting that although
New Jersey has not adopted the Model Act, New Jersey insurance law closely
mirrors the general principles and has consistently rejected discretionary clauses in
insurance contracts); Letter from Andalman to Redmer, supra note 17, at 2-6
(setting forth the grounds for adopting the Model Act in Maryland to declare all
discretionary clauses illegal); Letter from Cohen to Renaker, supra note 57 (using
the Model Act as support for the Insurance Department's rejection of discretionary
clauses in responding to a request for letter opinion).
61 PROHIBITION ON DISCRETIONARY CLAUSES, supra note 59, § 4(A)-(B).
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afforded by insurance laws in every state. A few states have
explicitly adopted the Model Act in an attempt to reestablish
control over the regulation of benefits administration abuse that
has allegedly been stripped away by this practice. 62 While the
Model Act seems to be somewhat restrictive in scope, some have
suggested that it should include other insurance policies as
well.63
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR CLAIMS CONTESTING
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Although ERISA is an extensive piece of legislation,
Congress did not undertake to define the appropriate standard of
review for courts to employ in considering claims that challenge
benefit administration. Rather, the federal court system has
been left to develop its own standards to best effectuate the
purposes of the Act.64  The Supreme Court settled on the
appropriate standard in its decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Bruch.65 An examination of the Firestone decision and the
implications of the two potential standards of review will
demonstrate the important stakes at play.
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Firestone and finally
dictated the appropriate bounds for lower courts to determine the
standard of review. 66 In Firestone, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for
Firestone after conducting a review of the record utilizing the
62 See Letter from Andalman to Redmer, supra note 17, at 1 (listing Maine,
Oregon, and Minnesota as states that have already adopted the Model Act).
63 See Letter from Cohen to Renaker, supra note 57, at 3 (arguing that NAIC did
not intend the Model Act to be limited solely to health insurance and observing that
NAIC is considering explicitly expanding its scope).
64 See Sarah J. Weiland, ERISA's Silence: Standards of Review in Deemed
Denial Employment Benefits Claims, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 613, 626 (2005)
(commenting that Congress intended ERISA to be silent with regard to a standard of
review to allow the federal courts to develop a common law on point).
65 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
66 In Firestone, the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. sold one of its divisions to
Occidental Petroleum Co. At issue was an unfunded severance plan that was
governed by ERISA. By law, Firestone was the administrator and fiduciary of the
plans, which was triggered by a "reduction in work force." Id. at 105-06. Two
employees were rehired by Occidental and sought severance payments from
Firestone under the termination pay plan. Firestone declined to extend the
termination pay to the employees, maintaining that they did not suffer an
appropriate reduction in workforce to trigger the plan. Firestone alone determined
the meaning of "reduction in work force" under the plan. Id. at 106.
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deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. 67 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded, maintaining that the
district court should have conducted a de novo review of the
record. 68 Specifically, the court of appeals held that when a
company doubles as the administrator of the policies as well, the
potential conflict of interest requires the use of the more
stringent de novo review. 69  Justice O'Connor delivered the
opinion for a unanimous Court in holding that the appropriate
standard of review in Firestone was de novo due to the potential
conflict of interest in allowing the company full discretion over
the implementation of the plan.70  Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor explicitly left open the possibility of employing a
deferential standard of review in the absence of a conflict of
interest when full discretion is afforded to the plan
administrator.7 1 As a result, the deferential standard continues
to be employed by the various circuits as a means of efficiently
allocating discretion to other responsible parties.
In addressing this issue, the Court reviewed the legislative
history of ERISA and drew upon both contract and trust
principles in the ruling.72 Specifically, ERISA codified "certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts" and
applied them to fiduciary responsibilities under the plan.73 The
Court found further justification for the use of deferential
standards in several treatises on trust law.7 4 The Supreme Court
67 Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 534-35 (E.D. Pa.
1986), rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987).
68 Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1987),
affd, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
69 Id. at 144-45, 149.
70 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
71 Id. at 111.
72 Id. at 110-13.
73 H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649. In
fact, some of the central concepts and formulations of the Act rely on trust law
terminology, such as the notions of a fiduciary and trustee relationship. See
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110.
74 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111. All of the sources that the Court cited stood for the
proposition that trust law allows for a deferential standard of review when a trustee
"exercises discretionary powers." Id.; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187
(1959) ('"here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise
of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an
abuse by the trustee of his discretion."); see also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT &
GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 188 (2d rev. ed.
1980) ("If the terms and extent of the power are clear, the court will not do the
trustee's work ... but will oblige him ... the use of the judgment and discretion of
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has also noted the legislative emphasis on trust law in other
contexts aside from the discretionary authority in this case.75
Ultimately, trust law dictates that if discretionary authority
resides with a trust administrator, a court should only review
decisions made by the administrator under a deferential
standard. 76  Specifically, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
notes that the court will not interfere unless
the trustee in exercising or failing to exercise the power acts
dishonestly, or with an improper even though not a dishonest
motive, or fails to use his judgment, or acts beyond the bounds
of a reasonable judgment. The mere fact that if the discretion
had been conferred upon the court, the court would have
exercised the power differently, is not a sufficient reason for
interfering with the exercise of the power by the trustee. 77
The Restatement goes on to identify specific circumstances in
detail and offers illustrations to guide the judiciary. 78
Thus, relying on the explicit terms of the agreement and
noting that ERISA "abounds with the language and terminology
of trust law,"79 the Court determined the appropriate standard of
review for the plan before the Court. Importantly, the Court
noted that trust law distinguishes between mandatory and
discretionary powers delegated by the trust instrument itself to
interpret terms80 Accepted principles of trust law, however, hold
the trustee.").
75 See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1995)
(holding that ERISA follows trust law by binding a company to the chosen specificity
of its amendment procedures for reservation clauses); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1985) (determining that the legislative history of
ERISA indicates that Congress intended to incorporate the fiduciary standards of
trust law into the statutory scheme). But see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525
U.S. 432, 447 (1999) ("Although trust law may offer a 'starting point' for analysis in
some situations, it must give way if it is inconsistent with 'the language of the
statute, its structure, or its purposes.'" (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
497 (1996))).
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959) (delineating when the
powers of the trustee are discretionary and determining when the judiciary should
overturn their determinations).
77 Id. § 187 cmt. e.
78 Id. § 187 illus. passim. The illustrations provided in the Restatement cover a
wide variety of circumstances and lay a basic framework for the courts to utilize.
79 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110.
80 Id. at 111 (quoting AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 187, at 14 (4th ed. 1987). Interestingly, the Court
injected principles of contract law into its decision at that point by implicitly
rejecting the trust law doctrine that the terms of the plan may be adequate when
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that the court is not bound by the instrument and can extend the
duties of the trustee as "determined by the rules of law that are
applicable to the situation ... and by the terms of the trust as
the court may interpret them, and not as they may be interpreted
by the trustee himself or by his attorney."81  This emphasis on
judicial discretion is in keeping with the Congressional intent
behind the passage of ERISA: The judiciary is able to fashion a
common law regarding the standard of review for adjudicating
ERISA claims, rooted in principles of trust law.82
In establishing these principles as guidance in future
litigation, the Court determined that this scheme best
"protect[ed] contractually defined benefits"8 3 as provided under
ERISA and effectively "promote[d] the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans."8 4 Recognizing the
degree of uncertainty that could arise when the plan
administrator is unsure whether the terms of the instrument
allocate full discretion, the Court emphasized that nothing
prohibits the party from obtaining instructions from the court for
protection.8 5 The Firestone decision has been implemented in
courts across the country and has laid the groundwork for a
relatively uniform implementation in benefit claims litigation.8 6
implied and construed as such by the courts. Here, the Court created a requirement
that discretionary authority be vested in the clear, exact language of the plan. Id. at
112-13. The Court looked to actions brought for denial of benefits before the
enactment of ERISA for guidance, determining that they were overwhelmingly
decided on the basis of contract law. Id. This seemingly grafts principles of contract
interpretation onto the trust-heavy doctrine already created. See Kathryn J.
Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L.
REV. 1083, 1114 (2001) (arguing that this paradigm is consistent with ERISA's
policy of clarity for the beneficiary, but inconsistent with the policy of fairness in the
claims review process).
81 ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 80, § 201.
82 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113 (quoting Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 148 (1985)).
84 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)).
s5 Id. at 112.
86 Following Firestone, which laid down the basic principles for determining the
appropriate standard of review, the most litigated issue in this regard centered
around determining what language effectively conferred discretionary authority
upon the plan administrator. "[Mlagic words such as 'discretion' and 'deference' may
not be 'absolutely necessary' to avoid a stricter standard of review ...." Jordan v.
Ret. Comm. of Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264, 1271 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Schein v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., No. 89-0052, 1991 WL 117638, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1991)). The New York Insurance Department provided two
examples of clauses that have been deemed to adequately confer discretionary
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In the aftermath of Firestone, courts across the country have
participated in the invitation to apply a relaxed, deferential
standard of review when discretion has been conferred on a plan
administrator.8 7 Some circuits employ the same arbitrary and
capricious standard as the Second Circuit.88  Other circuits
employ a slightly different standard of "abuse of discretion."8 9
Some circuits have suggested the difference between these two
relaxed standards is a "semantic, not a substantive" one.90
Because all of the circuits have decided to employ a
deferential standard, it is important to recognize the
implications. Under a deferential standard of review, only the
rarest of circumstances give rise to an adverse judgment, and
plan administrators are free to craft and interpret policies with
minimal judicial oversight.91 On the other hand, a de novo
authority to the administrator. See Circular Letter No. 8, supra note 17 ("[T]he
company has full, exclusive, and discretionary authority to determine all questions
arising in connection with the policy, including its interpretation .... ). Without
such direct language, courts have held that the plan language must unambiguously
demonstrate that the plan administrator has authority to construe the terms of the
plan. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 31 F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1994)
("[T]he Plan Administrator... shall be solely responsible for the administration and
interpretation of this Plan."). Nevertheless, the administrator must be careful to
ensure that the language is clear. See Sandy v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 222
F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plan requiring the beneficiary to
submit "satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [the Plan Administrator]" does not
confer sufficient discretion to trigger a deferential standard of review). For an
argument that the holding in Firestone misconstrues the principles of trust law and
merely functions to cause plan administrator's to insert clear language into plans to
gain the deferential review, see John H. Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks
Trusts, 1990 S. CT. REV. 207 (1990).
87 For an overview of the differing approaches taken by all the circuits with
regard to various issues of ERISA litigation, see ERISA SURVEY OF FEDERAL
CIRCUITS (Brooks R. Magratten ed., 2d ed. 2007). This comprehensive text examines
the approach taken in every circuit regarding both substantive and procedural
issues.
88 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; see also Sperandeo v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., 460 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2006); Tsoulas v. Liberty Life Assurance Co.
of Boston, 454 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2006); Smith v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 450 F.3d 253,
258-59 (6th Cir. 2006); Groves v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir.
2006); Vitale v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 420 F.3d 278, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2005).
89 See Donovan v. Eaton Corp., Long Term Disability Plan, 462 F.3d 321, 326
(4th Cir. 2006); Baker v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 364 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2004).
90 Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992).
91 This does not mean that insurance administrators are free to abuse the
system; they must still operate within the confines of the state insurance laws which
are enacted to regulate and protect consumers. Additionally, like any other product
being offered, insurance is subject to market forces and therefore insurance
companies must offer acceptable coverage to remain competitive.
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standard of review requires strict judicial oversight and,
effectively, a second look at adverse plan determinations.
Because of the polarization of these implications, it is crucial to
understand and weigh the policy concerns underlying each of
these positions to fully grasp what the Department intends to
accomplish in New York.
III. WHY THE COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO USE A DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD
Although federal courts have continuously upheld the
principles laid down in Firestone that have functioned to further
the policy of ERISA and provide clarity for crafting benefit
plans,92 commentators continue to debate the wisdom of the
Firestone decision. 93 While these concerns warrant discussion,
ultimately the current standards prove adequate to safeguard
the policies behind ERISA and the parties intended to be
protected.
A. Protection for Policyholders Is Adequate
Along with the New York Insurance Department, several
other commentators and organizations have raised policy
concerns regarding the current scheme. 94 The Department's first
92 Clarity has been achieved by demonstrating the necessary language and
provisions to either fall into or out of the deferential category.
93 See, e.g., Julia Field Costich, Note, Denial of Coverage for "Experimental"
Medical Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review Under ERISA, 79 KY. L.J. 801,
825-27 (1991) (discussing the impact of employing ERISA's de novo standard of
review for disbursement of medical benefits with experimental medical treatments);
Kennedy, supra note 80, at 1167-76 (arguing for a rule that review be de novo by
default); Langbein, supra note 86, at 211-12 (arguing that the Supreme Court has
misconstrued trust law as its foundation by equating private trusts with the trusts
that appear in ERISA); Peter A. Meyers, Comment, Discretionary Language,
Conflicts of Interest, and Standard of Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925, 951-53 (2005) (concluding that ERISA's quasi-
administrative model is compromised by allowing conflicted fiduciaries to make
crucial determinations without appropriate oversight). But see Tolle & McNamara,
supra note 47 (arguing that there are many benefits to all parties in maintaining the
standards set forth in Firestone).
94 For example, the California Insurance Department has made similar public
statements regarding the use of discretionary clauses as New York. See Cal. Dep't of
Ins., Notice to Withdraw Approval and Order for Information (Feb. 27, 2004), http://
www.insurance.ca.gov/0250-insurers/0300-insurers/0200-bulletins/bulletin-notices-
commiss-opinion/upload/Notice-February-27-2004.pdf [hereinafter California
Insurance Letter]. The federal courts in California will soon be hearing arguments in
a case that challenges the use of discretionary clauses in insurance policies based on
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argument is that because the courts cannot conduct a de novo
review, discretionary clauses can effectively "negate essential
features of the policies, contracts, and certificates" 95 by rendering
policies "illusory by nullifying the insurer's, Article 43
corporations or HMO's responsibility to pay."96 Boiled down, the
Department is concerned that the administrator can now
determine the terms of the policies differently than the allegedly
agreed-upon terms. Taken to the extreme, this implies a
complete perversion of trust law and it would effectively preclude
any reliance upon insurance contracts in any substantive form.
John Langbein commented that the Firestone opinion effectively
invites administrators to introduce common "boilerplate
language" that removes the plan from de novo review:
The Court in [Firestone] may have thought it was being
prudential in resting its decision on a narrow ground, but in
conditioning its requirement of de novo review on the language
of the plan document, the Court may have found a ground so
narrow as to be self-defeating. The Court's emphasis... on the
trust instrument as the basis for deferential review raises the
prospect that an ERISA plan may opt out of [Firestone's] de
novo review and back into the pre-[Firestone] world of judicial
deference merely by inserting some boilerplate to that effect in
the plan instrument. Indeed... the Court seems to invite plan
drafters to trump the decision by instrument.97
Langbein goes on to cite several possible scenarios that would
trigger this effect, effectively arguing that plan drafters will
begin to develop language that will function as an opt-out
provision and essentially subvert the purpose of trust law.95
Although this concern is legitimate, there is a myriad of
examples that demonstrate that these detractors do not describe
the reality of the situation. It must be recognized that in a
system that employs trust law principles in terms of allocating
discretion, there is a narrow opportunity for abuse.
this letter. See Burotto v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 163 F. App'x 565 (9th Cir. 2006). This is in
addition to the other commentators who have criticized the use of deferential
standards of review. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95 Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19; see also California Insurance Letter,
supra note 94, at 1 ("[T]he discretionary clause makes those payments contingent on
the unfettered discretion of the insurer, thereby nullifying the promise to pay and
rendering the contract potentially illusory.").
96 Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19.
97 Langbein, supra note 86, at 220.
98 See id. at 220-22.
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Nevertheless, out of the millions of decisions made annually with
regard to disbursement of benefits, only a tiny percentage are
disputed. In the face of this reality, it is difficult to imagine that
the current system does not provide adequate protection,
especially when the administrators remain accountable on
several grounds.
Importantly, a deferential standard of review does not
automatically accord complete affirmation of decisions. A
majority of cases that arise in the federal court system uphold
the decisions of plan administrators; however, this is merely
indicative of a system grounded in trust principles functioning
appropriately. As mentioned previously, one of the primary
functions of trust law is to accord significant discretion to a party
while maintaining the appropriate review mechanisms in place
to guard against systemic abuses. 99  In fact, certain trust
principles explicitly guard against these abuses. 100  These
safeguarding provisions essentially leave two options: find an
adequate violation of public policy, or illegality. 10 1 It appears as
though the Second Circuit has opted to pursue the illegality route
as opposed to vesting their argument solely on public policy
grounds. Courts across the country have consistently upheld the
legality of discretionary clauses in insurance contracts in the
absence of legislation to the contrary. 10 2 The nearly unanimous
judicial acceptance of discretionary clauses also indicates that
they should not be void against public policy since Firestone does
not mandate use of deferential standards. Thus, the adoption of
the deferential standard of review has been an affirmative
decision on the part of the federal judiciary after weighing the
factors for and against utilizing this scheme. Ultimately, judicial
99 See supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (1959) (providing that "a
provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if illegal"); see also id. § 61 (stating that a
trust provision is invalid if its enforcement would render it contrary to public policy).
1 Id. § 60 cmt. a ("An intended trust or a particular provision in the terms of
the trust may fail for illegality where ... the enforcement of the intended trust or
provision would be against the public policy, even though its performance does not
involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the trustee .... ").
102 For a general overview of the acceptance of plan language in the various
circuits, see ERISA SURVEY OF FEDERAL CIRCUITS, supra note 87. The editor of the
text has specifically delineated the plan language that has been used, circuit by
circuit. The common vein among all circuits is that discretionary language has been
accepted in every circuit, although the specific language that has been deemed
acceptable may differ.
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adoption and continued use of this method should be accorded
significant weight.
Additionally, although there are rare circumstances in which
it might be argued that the result of a decision is inequitable, on
the whole the current scheme provides more than sufficient
protection against abuses of discretion. Time and time again the
current system affording significant discretion has proven to be a
just standard leading to equitable results. 10 3  Proponents of
rendering discretionary clauses illegal in their respective states
undoubtedly are trying to advance their legitimate interests in
ensuring that the policyholders in their states are afforded as
much protection as possible while maintaining as much control
at the state regulatory level. Without discounting the legitimate
purpose that they have in mind, adjusting the current scheme is
unnecessary and would simply serve to undermine many years of
clearly established federal judicial practice in enforcing
agreements.
B. State Law Is Not Sufficiently Impacted
Some commentators suggest that discretionary clauses run
afoul of New York insurance law because they are unjust and
intended to deceive the policyholder.10 4 It is argued that, taken
together, the fact that discretionary clauses allow administrators
to sidestep agreements made in the insurance policy and may be
103 In addition to the myriad of benefit determinations made by plan
administrators daily that are ultimately equitable, in those rare circumstances when
the benefit determinations are manifestly unfair, the courts have overturned the
determination. See, e.g., Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. McKenzie, 467 F.3d 383, 384-90
(4th Cir. 2006) (upholding the district court's determination that an insurance
company abused its discretion in denying a cochlear implant despite repeated
authorizations from plaintiffs physician); DeGrado v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co.,
451 F.3d 1161, 1174-76 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a plan administrator's
decision to treat the beneficiary's disability as recurrent rather than new was
arbitrary and capricious).
104 Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19. This is also raised in the case of
Burotto v. Continental Casualty Co., 163 F. App'x 565 (9th Cir. 2006), in which the
claimants allege that discretionary clauses violate California insurance law because
the policies are rendered fraudulent. California employs a similar paradigm as New
York in its insurance law. Specifically, like New York, it provides that an Insurance
Commissioner cannot approve an insurance policy that fails to "conform in any
respect with any laws of this state." CAL. INS. CODE § 10291.5(b)(13); cf. N.Y. INS.
LAW § 3201(b)(1) (McKinney 2000) ("No policy.., shall be delivered or
issued... unless it has been filed with and approved by the superintendent as
conforming to the requirements of this chapter and not inconsistent with law.").
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deceptive in nature serves to effectively erode the protections
that are afforded by insurance laws. 10 5 In other words, the
detailed state insurance scheme is largely rendered ineffective if
the plan administrator has sole discretion over interpretation of
the terms of an agreement and the judicial system affords him
significant discretion, even though the policy must be crafted
within the body of relevant insurance law. The appellants in
Burotto v. Continental Casualty Co. argued that the state law
protections that are built into the insurance laws would be
rendered inapplicable to the policies although the policies
purport to comply with applicable state regulations. 106
Specifically, they argue that discretionary language deprives the
insured of protections of California law, because courts reviewing
benefits decisions for abuse of discretion will not apply state law
principles such as the rule of contra preferentem and the doctrine
of reasonable expectations, under which ambiguities are resolved
in the insured's favor. Policy language that allows the insurer to
evade these state-law protections "fails to conform" to state law
within the meaning of California Insurance Code section
10291.5(b)(13).107 Thus the California Insurance Department's
current judicial scheme for reviewing claims of adverse policy
decisions not only violates public policy, but also sanctions a
subversion of well-established principles of state law.108
What this position overlooks is that most applications of
state law are rendered irrelevant by ERISA's sweeping
preemption provision.10 9 Unless the state law is specifically
aimed at regulating insurance, ERISA governs." 0 This in turn
means that unless there is a state law on point that is saved from
preemption, trust law principles will govern interpretation. Even
if there are state laws that are saved from preemption, these
protections would only be sacrificed in the rare circumstances
105 See California Insurance Letter, supra note 94, at 1 ("[Discretionary] clauses
effectively deprive California insureds of protections under California law."). In New
York, the protections afforded by the insurance scheme are those specific provisions
that protect unfair or deceptive trade practices. See Circular Letter No. 14, supra
note 19.
106 Opening Brief of Appellant at 29-32, Burotto, 163 F. App'x 565 (No. 04-
55180).
107 Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
108 See supra note 19.
109 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
110 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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where a court could not determine that a decision by a plan
administrator that allegedly violates a state insurance provision
was not an abuse of discretion. When the beneficiary of an
insurance policy has been unfairly deprived of the benefits that
flow from their policy, more often than not, the administrative
record will suffice for a fair and adequate judicial determination.
C. Adverse Determinations Will Be Mitigated by Business Self-
Interest
Finally, the Department also argues that perhaps the biggest
injustice achieved by utilizing this scheme is that it deprives the
policyholder of effective access to fair judicial review, and
essentially condones a potentially severe injustice.11' In effect,
they assert that the current paradigm denies the policyholder of
his statutorily required right to appeal. 112  The underlying
assumption with this argument is that policyholders should be
afforded the same degree of judicial review as any other suit for
breach of contract. In essence, the right to judicial review under
ERISA standards would be truncated by the undue deference
afforded to plan administrators in contravention of the stated
policy to protect policyholders. 113  The alleged result is that
without significant judicial oversight and the threat of a serious
adverse decision, the system lends itself to abuse at the hands of
plan administrators.
In addition to the protections that are afforded by trust law
and the adequate safeguard offered by the judicial system
mentioned previously, this argument overlooks one important
factor that provides an additional safeguard against serious
abuses. Namely, every insurance company has a vested interest
in ensuring that its customers are satisfied with their coverage.
If an insurance company develops a reputation for being
ineffective or unreliable, that insurance company will likely not
find success within an industry teeming with other providers.
While an occasional adverse determination might not have a
drastic impact on its business outlook, the company will be
111 See Circular Letter No. 14, supra note 19.
112 Id. For an example of a statutorily defined right "to recover benefits due to
[an insured] under the terms of his plan," see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
113 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) ("ERISA is a
comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.").
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seeking to ensure that it does not become a regular phenomenon.
Thus, allocating discretion to plan administrators works
efficiently because the administrators have a concurrent interest
in ensuring the livelihood of their business.
Closely tied to this concern are the economic ramifications of
increased litigation. Additional litigation ultimately means that
the insurance company, along with the beneficiaries, will have
additional costs. Unfortunately, these costs will not be quietly
absorbed by the company. Rather, they will be passed along to
the plan participants. With insurance costs already extremely
high, both sides should be interested in keeping costs down. Plan
participants often find it difficult to make payments already, and
insurance companies do not want the negative business
implications of rising costs. The scheme currently in place
provides the appropriate balance between ensuring that the
beneficiaries are protected from arbitrary or unjust benefit
determinations, while simultaneously stemming the tide of
potential litigation and keeping costs down on many fronts.
Altering the current system without the benefit of significant
congressional study and debate would prove an unwise departure
from established practice and precedent.
D. Additional Factors Warrant Maintaining the Current
Approach
A primary benefit to the judicial system of the current
standard of review scheme based on trust law is the increased
judicial efficiency. This efficiency is accomplished by placing
discretion in the hands of an appropriate, responsible figure,
which requires minimal judicial oversight, and thus less of the
court's time and energy. The trust principles that led the
Firestone Court to establish a potentially deferential standard of
review go hand-in-hand with the discovery rules under ERISA,
which provide a similar increase in efficiency and conservation of
resources. 114  Regulations limit discovery in ERISA cases
significantly when a deferential standard applies. Reducing the
scope of review to the administrative record decreases the cost to
114 An ERISA plan administrator is required to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1133 and the regulations in
29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1. See Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp, 761 F.2d 1003, 1007 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1985).
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litigants and conserves judicial resources by significantly
decreasing the amount of review required.
Likewise, the efficiency goals of the judiciary go hand-in-
hand with the explicit efficiency goals of ERISA. One stated goal
of ERISA is to encourage the private resolution of disputes:
Within the labor context federal courts have consistently
favored internal resolution procedures in order to promote
orderly settlement of disputes ... and to avert whenever
possible the expense and delay incident to resort to the courts.
ERISA also endorsed this policy by conferring broad managerial
discretion upon the pension plan trustees, who are primarily
responsible for devising and implementing claims procedure. 115
Thus, requiring the courts to conduct a thorough, de novo review
of every adverse administrative decision arising under ERISA
could subvert the stated policies of internal resolution.116 It is
argued that a deferential standard of review discourages parties
from resorting to the court to seek judicial remedy. With the
federal court system already strained, "[p]ermitting district
courts to consider evidence not presented to the plan
administrator would 'seriously impair' ERISA's efficiency
goals" 117 and increase the burden on an already over-burdened
system.118  While the Firestone Court noted that "the threat of
increased litigation is not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a
de novo standard,"119 when considered in conjunction with the
public policy arguments already noted, it warrants consideration.
By allowing courts to alleviate their burden by affording
discretion to plan administrators, the courts serve the two-fold
function of reducing their own caseload and time constraints and
promoting ERISA's goals of private resolution.
As mentioned previously, a deferential standard of review
also results in less time and money spent in litigating decisions
of the administrator. Mandating a de novo review of the record
115 Grossmuller v. Local 813, Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric.
Implement Workers, 715 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
116 See id. (discussing the endorsement of internal resolution procedures of
adverse benefit claims in the legislative history of ERISA).
117 Stanley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790 (E.D. Va. 2004).
11s Under an abuse of discretion standard the court is limited to reviewing the
administrative record. A de novo review would expand the scope of permissible
review, allowing the court to consider matters outside of the administrative record
and to substitute its own judgment for the plan administrator's. This obviously
requires a great deal more time, effort, and expense to accomplish.
119 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
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could potentially "involve far-reaching, open-ended, nearly
limitless discovery." 120 Additionally, the extra incurred costs and
time would "frustrate the [policy of] prompt and affordable
resolution of benefit claims."121 Thus, the system of deferential
treatment saves all of the parties the costs associated with time-
consuming litigation in favor of simply passing on the
administrative record for review and emphasizing significant
trust in the plan administrators making the initial decision
giving rise to the litigation.
Additional consideration should be given to congressional
inaction when confronted with this very issue in a bill that was
introduced in 1982, before the Firestone case had been decided.122
The Firestone Court noted that although the bill failed to pass,
such failure may not be indicative of a legislative intent to
acquiesce to the deferential standard.1 23 Furthermore, the fact
that Congress has not revisited the issue in any subsequent
sessions indicates that the issue is not of sufficient priority to
warrant drastic action. This is particularly true considering the
explicit recognition of the importance of ERISA,1 24 and the clear
movement by many parties, including those in state
governments, to advocate for a change. While congressional
silence does not necessarily equate with acquiescence, the nearly
twenty-five year silence since H.R. 6226 was proposed in 1982
provides some indication that Congress does not feel it necessary
to address at this time.
Finally, as evidenced by the extensive treatment that the
Firestone Court gave the topic,1 25 the federal court system has
consistently construed issues arising out of ERISA litigation in
terms of the stated emphasis and reliance upon principles drawn
from trust law. 126 With this in mind, passing legislation that
would eliminate the use of discretionary clauses in insurance
contracts would directly subvert the explicit intent of Congress in
enacting ERISA. The appropriate paradigm for considering
120 Newman v. Standard Ins. Co., 997 F. Supp. 1276, 1280 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
121 Stanley, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
122 H.R. 6226, 97th Cong. (2d Sess. 1982).
123 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 114.
124 See WOOTEN, supra note 5, at 1 (" '[T]he pension reform bill,' [Senator Jacob
Javits] told his Senate colleagues, 'is the greatest development in the life of the
American worker since social security.'" (first alteration in original)).
125 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110-15.
126 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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issues raised through ERISA litigation is through the lens of
trust law, which not only allows for discretionary authority but
also encourages it.127 In fact, allowing discretionary authority is
one of the mainstays of trust law.128 Eliminating this feature of
insurance regulation would strip a major characteristic from the
trust relationship between plan administrators and beneficiaries
and effectively neuter the trust aspects of the ERISA scheme.
State courts should be prevented from taking these matters into
their own hands because the interpretations at the state level
could directly contravene the explicit intent of Congress. If a
change should be deemed necessary, it should occur at the
federal level to ensure congressional control over the statute that
Congress took great pains to pass in the first place. In addition,
this would ensure continued uniformity with regard to judicial
review under ERISA and allow insurance companies to be
completely cognizant of the risks and rewards of policy language
they choose to include.
CONCLUSION
ERISA's passage was the product of many years of failed
attempts to regulate the private pension system through various
mechanisms. 129 The result was a comprehensive statute that has
effectively regulated the insurance industry since its passage,
providing much needed guidance and uniformity in the system.
The current movement toward eliminating the use of
discretionary clauses represents an unnecessary departure from
the system that Congress established and the principles that
provide its foundation. This action would significantly alter the
landscape of both ERISA litigation and the insurance industry as
a whole, with far-reaching implications. Removing the ability of
the judicial system to defer to plan administrators unnecessarily
handcuffs the courts into reviewing adverse claims in increasing
amounts.
To quote the old adage, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." There
is no pressing need to alter the current state of ERISA litigation
due to the many safeguards present explicitly in the statute and
impliedly in the business of insurance. In the end, any alteration
127 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (elaborating on the
extent of discretionary powers in trust relationships).
128 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111 (discussing the principles of trust law).
129 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
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would be a costly mistake, both to the judiciary and to all of the
future insurance beneficiaries upon whom the economic burden
of this action would fall.
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